Geographical Indications within the Purview of the WTO as a Tool for the Promotion of Economic Interests and Cultural Heritage

Geographical Indications within the Purview of the WTO as a Tool for the Promotion of Economic Interests and Cultural Heritage: Conflicting Positions between the Old World and the New World and Some Solutions Thereof

Barrister Jacob A. Akuo

LLM European and International Trade & Investment Law, France

Master’s 2 Droit des Affaires Internationale France

LLM International Human Rights Law (Economic Relations), UK

SECTION ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), the subject of intellectual property rights (“IPRs”) has largely been a debate between the North and the South. The North represents developed countries while the South represents developing/least developed countries. During the Uruguay Round of negotiations, developing/least developed countries considered the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects on Intellectual Property (“TRIPS Agreement”), as an attempt by the US and (to a lesser extent Europe) to impose on them inappropriate and Western-style system of legislation.[1]

Geographical Indications (GIs) as an IPR theme has drastically reshaped the composition of the alliances to the debate. The debate on the level of protection of this IPR is between the “Old World” (representing the European Union and its Member States, Turkey and Switzerland) on the one hand; and the New World (representing the United States, Canada, Australia, Argentina, Chile, and other Latin American countries, Japan, South Korea etc.) on the other hand. Whilst the former pushes for an extensive and stronger protection of GIs beyond the current levels by the TRIPS Agreement, the latter firmly opposes this agenda considering that they had reluctantly agreed to GIs as a separate IPR under the TRIPS Agreement as a position of compromise.[2] The outcome of this debacle has made GIs one of the most contested issues that has polarized the WTO and its negotiations to unprecedented levels.[3]  As if the composition of the parties to the debate is not odd enough, developing countries like India, Madagascar, Guinea, Jamaica, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, etc joining forces with the “Old World” either as “demandeurs” or opponents in the ongoing WTO talks.[4]

The polarized debate on GIs and its effects has equally been witnessed outside the WTO multilateral negotiations. For example, it is common knowledge amongst international trade lawyers and negotiators that the failure to agree on GIs is partially responsible for impasse in negotiations of Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the EU and the US. In a 2014 bipartisan letter to the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”), 56 Senators of the US Congress bluntly stated inter alia that “[W]e urge you to make clear to the EU counterparts that the US will reject any proposal in the TTIP negotiations now underway that would restrict in any way the ability of US producers to use common names (e.g. for cheeses)”[5]

With such haggles on this issue, this paper will attempt to show how the goal of GIs is to promote economic interest and cultural heritage. Commentary to this effect shall focus in section two on the current legal regime of GIs under the TRIPS Agreement and the delicate balance put in place by this Agreement. In section three, it shall examine the ongoing conflicting negotiation positions of the Old World and the New World and the reasonings that underprop these positions. Section four shall briefly show how the Old World is using article 24 of the TRIPS Agreement (bilateral negotiations) together with article XXIV GATT to extend the protection of its GIs beyond the scope of TRIPS to agricultural products and foodstuff and compromises thereof. Lastly, section five shall conclude.

Section One

GIs Regime in the TRIPS Agreement

First off, GIs are “[…] indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin.”[6] As  the most multilaterally accepted definition, it is evident that the fundamental concept that underscores GIs is that specific geographic locations yield product qualities that cannot be replicated elsewhere.[7] This is because the place is essential to the product, therefore some contend that producers outside the specific region should not be allowed to use the name of the place as labels to market the product.[8]

After complex negotiations during the Uruguay Round[9], the TRIPS Agreement puts in place two delicate levels of protection for GIs with exceptions in the form of grandfather rights and generic names.[10] The two levels of protection include the standard protection applicable to all products[11] and the enhanced protection applied to wines and spirits.[12]

Under the standard protection, legal means shall be provided to interested parties to prevent third parties from using designations or presentations on goods that suggest that the goods in question originate from a geographical area other than the true area of origin, which may potentially be misleading to the public as to the geographical origin. Members are equally obliged to ensure that interested parties have legal recourse against third parties whose use of geographical origins constitutes an act of unfair competition as stipulated in article 10bis of the Paris Convention.[13]  Similarly, where the legislation of a Member so permits, trademarks which infringe GIs with the intention of misleading the public should be invalidated by such Members ex officio.[14]

Thanks to what may be attributed to a robust wines and spirits lobby, an enhanced protection is provided for wines and spirits under article 23 TRIPS Agreement. Members shall provide legal means to interested parties to prevent infringers of their GIs even where the true origin of the infringing good is indicated or the GI ‘used in translation or accompanied by expressions such as “kind”, “type”, “style”, “imitation” or the like’.[15]  Trademarks which infringe GIs shall be invalidated where the legislation of the Member concerned so permit or at the behest of the interested party.[16] In case of homonymous GIs, steps should be taken by the Member concerned to ensure a smooth co-existence while also ensuring that the public is not misled.[17] And finally, Members shall engage in negotiations to create a multilateral system of registration of GIs for wines and spirits.[18] This provision is particularly important because has now become the subject of intense debates since the initiation of the Doha Round negotiations.

Under the article 24 exceptions, Members can derogate from the provisions of the TRIPS on GIs with regards to names they consider as generic whether they be pertaining to wines and spirits or other products.[19] Then, there are the grandfather clauses: names pertaining to GIs used for wines and spirits for a continuous period of 10 years preceding April 15, 1994 or in good faith preceding that date shall continue to be in force even if they infringe GIs of other countries.[20] Similarly,  trademarks which were applied for in good faith or used in good faith before TRIPS Agreement commenced application in a Member or before the GI was protected in that country shall continue to enjoy their rights to be exploited.[21] Moreover, nothing in the TRIPS prejudices the rights of a person to use his/her name or the name of his/her predecessor except in circumstances where such use is done in a manner that misleads the public.[22] Lastly, there is the standstill clause which requires Members implementing the TRIPS Agreement not to diminish the protection on GIs that existed before the date of entry into force.[23]

SECTION THREE

Expansion and Stronger Protection of GIs in the TRIPS Agreement: Old World vS New World Divide

The TRIPS Agreement itself encourages Members to engage in bilateral or multilateral negotiations to enhance protection on wines and spirits as well as other products.[24] This section shall examine the ongoing multilateral negotiation between the Old World and the New World on GIs under the auspices of the WTO. It shall examine the negotiating positions of each faction considering their economic interest and cultural heritage. But first a brief negotiating history before the Parties to the WTO got to this impasse shall be set out below.

In the fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha[25], Members agreed on new rounds of negotiation (the Doha Round) amongst which was the TRIPS Agreement and GIs. On GIs, up for negotiation was the extension of the article 23 protection to other products and the creation of a multilateral system of protection for wines and spirits.[26]  It was agreed that these negotiations were to be concluded by the Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancun, Mexico.[27] During the Cancun Ministerial Conference, talks on GIs broke down without an acute semblance of a way forward. They have now been taking place within the overall timetable of the Doha Round.[28]

Over the years, three sets of proposals were submitted by the Old World and the New World and a third block (Hong Kong and China). Leading the Old World was the EU who in 2005 tabled a proposal[29] requesting for the amendment of section 3 of the TRIPS Agreement with a view to extending the regime of protection available for GIs on wines and spirits to GIs[30] on all products.  In addition, the proposal called for the inclusion of an annex to the TRIPS Agreement establishing a multilateral system of notification and registration of GIs.[31]

On the other hand, there is a joint proposal co-sponsored by leading New World countries like United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Japan, Costa Rica, etc.[32] The joint proposal recommends a decision by the TRIPS Council to set up a voluntary system where notified GIs would be registered in a database.[33] It equally ensures that non-participating countries are only “encouraged” but “not obliged” to consult the database. Lastly, it doesn’t even address the enhancement of protection to other products.[34]

The third proposal by China and Hong Kong puts in place some sort of a compromise between the two positions.[35] In their proposal, a registered term would enjoy a more limited “presumption” than under the EU proposal, and only in those countries choosing to participate in the system.[36]

With this level of divergence which only seems endlessly elastic, the question is what underlies these debates? The WTO has done a compilation of the issues raised and the views expressed by the negotiators[37] in which you can derive that the foundations of these debates revolve around economic interest and cultural heritage.

  1. ECONOMIC INTEREST
  2. The Free-riding on the reputation of the GIs

According to proponents of extended protection, the current provision of article 22 of the TRIPS Agreement does “not prevent the free-riding on the reputation of a product which displays unique features and a specific quality due to its geographical origin by other products bearing the same geographical indication but produced in other regions and not possessing the same qualities.”[38] If free-riding on a good’s reputation is overlooked and the reputation of the GI is damaged, then it may drive down the price of the originating goods.[39]. Extension therefore will guarantee the protection of legitimate producers of a product identified by a geographical indication against illegal use of the GIs of such category of products.[40]

On the contrary, the New World opposes extension. The US argues that the article 22 and its implementation through certification trademarks adequately addresses the concerns about protecting names and connotations of national heritage and quality.[41] They argue further that they provide a transparent, easy-to-use system for the protection of GIs, for example “Stilton” for cheese, “Parma” for ham, “Roquefort” for cheese, “Swiss” for chocolate, etc. New Zealand argues that only countries which had not sufficiently implemented article 22 or registered their GIs domestically could perceive that it was insufficient.[42]

The New World argues further that indications of origin used in the Old World were used in their countries not because the GIs were well-known around the world and the users sought to “free ride” but because users in the New World emigrated from the Old World and brought with them the names they had used in their countries of origin in the Old World.[43] and this migration was between the 17th and 20th century long before the notion of GIs and their protection had become a debate.[44] They argue further that these immigrants have invested heavily in the development, production and marketing of these terms making them well-known in the global market. Based on this premise, they aver it can be accurately argued that the Old World are the ones seeking to free-ride on the global market strength of these previously otherwise unknown GIs. [45]

  1. Extension to Prevent GIs from Becoming Generic

Proponents argue that, because article 22 does not provide the kind of extended protection like that of wines and spirits. GIs which are free-ridden by products not having the quality like those of origin face the risk becoming generic pursuant to this illegitimate use. This may mean significant loss of all economic potentials and economic value.[46]

They claim further that extension, unlike the current article 22, the use of a GI with a “délocalisant” indicating the true origin (e.g., so-called semi-generics) or use in translation or with expressions such as “kind”, “type”, “style”, “imitation” or the like would be prevented for all GIs alike, and would help thwart more GIs from becoming generic. They justify this by pointing at the globalisation and the speed at which information and goods move in the contemporary world.[47]

On the other hand, the proponents against extension maintain their argument that an implementation of article 22 is enough to ensure that GIs do not become generic and thus no economic loss.[48] They cast doubt that there exist any examples of products that, whilst fully exploiting the protection available, had lost their distinctive nature and become generic. But they go further to state that if such examples do exist, then it is the result of the failure of the of the holders of the right who may not have diligently protected and enforced their interest.[49]

The New World points to the fact that proponents of extension of rights are rent seeking monopolists whose actions have potential creating barriers to trade. To them, extension will only unfairly reduce competition and encourage monopolization and higher prices.[50]

  1. Extension will foster the interest of beneficiary producers to market their products and increase their trading opportunities

Switzerland argues that improved legal security for GIs at the multilateral level would encourage producers to use GIs as an efficient marketing tool.[51]  It will incentivise producers to exploit international markets thus promoting international trade. [52] Economic development will be fostered in rural communities and a quality-oriented agricultural and industrial policy will be fortified. This will especially be the case for least developed countries.[53]

In contrast, New World resist arguing that extension does not per se make GIs as quality products and a valuable marketing tool.[54] They posit that it is hard work establishing a quality product and the promoting of the product in the marketplace that turn the GI from simply the name of a place into a valuable market tool.  Australia has argued that there has been no evidence by the Old World that GIs had been the casual factor that increase market share.[55]

Chile and Argentina argue that the recognition of a product as a GI does not indeed guarantee market access taking into consideration other barriers like tariffs and technical regulations plus other non-tariff barriers to trade.[56] Argentina and Australia (two successful New World wine producers in  their own right) are quick to argue that the enhanced wine and spirits protection in article 23 is not a “panacea”, reason why the highly regulatory approach of wines in Europe made it difficult for wine producers to innovate and market in a manner that attracted consumers to match the success of the New World.[57]

  1. Impact of Extension on the Relationship between Trademarks and GIs

The Old World contends that extension will ensure that the “registration and validity of registered trademarks containing or consisting of geographical indications would be precluded even if they did not mislead the public.”[58] They argue that it will facilitate the examination of trademarks by judges and administrative authorities whose simple objective and criterion would be to ensure that the trademark which consists of a GI really has the geographical origin when deciding to refuse registration of a trademark, if their legislations so permits, or to invalidate the trademark for products not originating from the region.[59] They maintain that the provisions of article 24.5 of the TRIPS Agreement shall continue to apply and the EU particularly points to the fact that there has been no instance where a GI has ever been used to remove a trademark.[60]

On the other hand, the New World regard this argument with suspect. The US argues that GIs like trademarks have the same objectives: providing the consumer with the true source of the product in order to avoid deceitful practices by infringers. [61]  They claim that under international trademark law and the TRIPS Agreement, a trademark owner with prior rights can prevent users of identical or similar marks with the potential to confuse and mislead the public, and this could even include GIs as contained in article 22.[62] Therefore, GIs established after a trademark should not prejudice the rights of the trademark owner under article 16 of the TRIPS Agreement.

They regard as unacceptable the notion that GIs have precedent over trademarks because no IPR should have precedent over the other. The US argues further that extension will create troublesome conflicts with trademarks forcing users to either cease to use the marks or stop manufacturers of similar terms from using similar terms that confuse or mislead the public. They specifically accuse the EU of giving superior right to GIs over trademarks despite prior rights. They claim that the EU has provided no assurance that article 24.5 TRIPS Agreement will be applied satisfactorily. To them, trademarks with prior rights being forced to compete with GIs would be unfair.[63]

In response, the EU has argued that it is not fair to suggest that articles 16 and 22 of TRIPS are parallel. To the EU, article 16 should be compared instead to article 23.1 but only to a limited extent. Confusion of the consumer is presumed and need not be proved in article 16 when goods or services are identical.[64]

  1. The Clawback Clause and Resistance thereof

The New World are particularly concerned that the EU in the Negotiating Group on Agriculture, tried to slip pass a proposal for clawback of rights, something they reiterate should be negotiated under the TRIPS.[65] To the New World, clawback proposal means three things: Firstly, going back in time to prohibit the use of certain terms, some of which had become generic and trademarked by requiring the WTO Members to give up their right to invoke the article 24 exceptions.[66] Secondly, use of all terms in the future considered as GIs will equally be vetted or effectively prohibited.[67] Lastly, a push for a multilateral register to prohibit the use of generic terms by legitimate users and owners of trademarks.[68] To them, the clawback which would result from extension would gravely affect the delicate balance that has been put in place by TRIPS.[69]

In their defence, the EU argued that extension was a forward-looking initiative meant to establish protection of GIs not yet considered to be generic or registered as trademarks.[70] They contended further that their proposition to be negotiated in the Agricultural Committee was an initiative meant at clawing back the exclusive use of certain GI names for the relevant WTO Member, even if they were considered generic or trademarks in other WTO Members.[71] They claim it was an issue of market access and little about extension.[72]

  1. CULTURAL HERITAGE

Proponents of GIs extension have this claim at the core of their arguments. To them GIs need to be protected because of unique features of the products that are a result of their geographical origin and characterized by decades long traditions.[73]  The EU argues that for many European farmers, the GIs that are considered by the New World as generic are “a tradition, a place, a way of life, and the quality of a product.”[74]

Production of products like ‘Parmigiano-Reggiano’ is only possible by putting together geography and traditional techniques used to produce it; “[t]he cheese can be made only in certain areas of Italy, during certain months to ensure that the milk comes from cattle that have fed on fresh grass, never fodder from other locations.[75] The European Union claims it is simply fighting for its farmers and rural producers who are up against multinationals like Kraft Foods and the US trademark law maze.[76] European food culture will equally be protected from appropriation and free-rides by these multinationals.

On the other hand, the New World argues that as immigrants from the Old World, they had brought with them some of these cultural traditions including names, and terms. It would therefore be culturally insensitive to deprive them from using these names by people who live in their ancestral lands.[77] Under such culinary traditions, these terms were, for immigrants in their new and adopted country, simply generic descriptions for food products and food preparation. Therefore, policy objectives should encourage diversity.[78]

In response, the Old World has pointed to the grandfathering exception under Article 24 which to them is of relevance considering this important agricultural non-trade concern, namely, the preservation of cultural identity.[79]  Equally, article 23.3 on homonymous GIs provides additional proof that extension is not in conflict with the preservation of cultural diversity.[80]

SECTION FOUR

RECONCILING CONTRASTING STANCES: BILATERAL NEGOTIATION OF GIS

GATT encourages Member to negotiate bilateral or multilateral Free-Trade Agreements with each other to further liberalize trade.[81] Equally the TRIPS Agreement encourages Members to enhance protection of GIs through bilateral or multilateral agreements.[82]

The European Union as leaders of the GIs cause for the Old World has resorted to this as a way forward towards enhanced protection of its GIs. The European Commission has successfully negotiated multiple FTAs with some New World countries all of which have chapters on intellectual property (amongst which are GIs). The notable ones recently concluded are between Canada, South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Mexico, Singapore all of which have annexes listing scores of country specific EU GIs on food and agricultural products. Some are still under negotiations like EU-MECOSUR and the TTIP. Specific Agreements with the US[83], and Australia[84] protect specific EU GIs on wines.

This section shall examine how the EU uses these agreements to advance protection of GIs on agricultural products and foodstuffs and how a delicate balance is stroke. The case study shall be based on the Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada which is now in force.

CETA is one of the most outstanding achievements of the EU when it comes to bilateral agreement on GIs with regards to agricultural products and foodstuffs. This is not only because Canada is a major partner to the EU in international trade but equally because it makes up a formidable part of the New World faction that strongly opposes enhanced protection of GIs on other products.

In the CETA, GIs are contained in the Intellectual Property Chapter. [85] The definition follows the TRIPS Agreement approach of “essentially attributable” but points specifically to agricultural products and foodstuff,[86]  a very important achievement by the EU in this subject. Similarly. Article 20.18 on the list of geographical indications refers to Part A of Annex 20-A which contains a detailed but exhaustive list of EU’s GIs on agricultural products and foodstuffs.[87] In this Annex, the EU successfully included some very contested GIs by the New World as generic names such as “asiago,” “feta,” “fontina,” “gorgonzola” and “munster” “Beaufort”. This is something the EU has unsuccessfully tried under the WTO multilateral negotiations.

Nonetheless, Canada achieves some compromises. The EU recognizes homonymous names and obligations to create conducive conditions for co-existence.[88] For example the term “Beaufort” in association with cheese products, produced in the proximity of the geographical place called “Beaufort range”, Vancouver Island, British Columbia.[89]

Compromises are likewise made in the form of exceptions that put in place certain grandfather rights. The extent of the grandfathering depends on the number of asterisks on the product listed in the Annex 20-A. The following GIs are accompanied by one asterisk: “asiago,” “feta,” “fontina,” “gorgonzola” and “munster”. In this light, Canada will not be required to prevent the use of the names where these terms are accompanied by expressions as “kind”, “type”, “style”, “imitation” or the like and is in combination with a legible and visible indication of the geographical origin of the product concerned.[90] Also, the GIs just mentioned shall not prevent the use in Canada any of these indications by any person including their successors and assignees, who made commercial use of those indications with regards to products in the class of “cheeses” preceding the date of October 18, 2013.

Still under grandfather rights, producers of products with two asterisks in Annex 20-A (Nurnburger Bratwurst) may be used by anyone who produced them for the fresh and frozen meats category for five years before October 18, 2013.[91] There is a transitional period of five years from the date of entry into force of CETA for those who used the terms for less than five years before October 18, 2013.[92] Producers of products with three asterisks in Annex 20-A (Jambon de Bayonne and Beaufort cheese)  in cheese or dry cured meats can continue to use these terms as long as they used them for ten years prior to October 18, 2013.[93]  There is similarly a transitional period of five years  from the date of entry into force of CETA for those who used the these terms for less than ten years as of October 18, 2013.[94] This is an excellent compromise for the EU and Canada because the EU has protected these names in their jurisdiction as GIs while Canada considers them before CETA as generic names.

With regards to trademarks, Canada successfully negotiated another grandfather clause into CETA. It provides that a trademark applied or registered in good faith before the date of signing of the Agreement or its amendment thereof shall be valid and can be used even if the trademark is identical to a GI[95]. Likewise, as a New World country that has been at the forefront of the right to continuously use generic names, they achieved that because CETA provides that geographical names that when translated amount to generic names shall not prejudice the rights of people who used them in the course of business.[96] This right interestingly even extends to plant variety and animal breeds.[97]

Another thought-provoking compromise in CETA is that trademarks with the following names that pertain to some EU GIs: “Valencia Orange”, “Orange Valencia”, “Valencia”, “Black Forest Ham”, “Jambon Forêt Noire”, “Tiroler Bacon”, “Bacon Tiroler”, “Parmesan”, “St. George Cheese”, and “Fromage St-George[s]” can still be validly registered in Canada so long as they are not intended to mislead the public about their origin.[98] Lastly, Canadian producers can use the term “comte” for county (for example “Comté du Prince-Edouard”; “Prince Edward County”; “Comté de Prescott-Russell”; “Prescott-Russell County”).[99]

SECTION FIVE

CONCLUSION

GIs extension remain a hot topic of debate in international trade negotiations. They have brought multilateral and bilateral negotiations to a halt. The conflicting positions with both economic interest undertones and cultural heritage reasonings show that negotiations still have a long way to go to achieve multilateral success. The EU with lots to lose if protection is not extended has gone on the offensive, successfully using FTAs to foster their interests. Though it may sound ambitious taking into consideration the different interests at stake, the success achieved thus far by the EU can be replicated in WTO multilateral negotiations. This will ensure a uniform approach to this issue, put in place predictability and security of international trade policy and help avoid the “spaghetti bowl effect” of FTAs.

 Bibliography

Primary Sources

Laws and Treaties

  • TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) entered into force on January 01, 1995
  • GATT 1994: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) entered into force on January 01, 1995
  • Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement between the EU and Canada
  • Agreement between the European Communities and the United States on Trade in Wines L 87/2 24/3/20106
  • Agreement between the European Communities and the Australia on Trade in Wines L 28/3 30/01/2009

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Books and Journals

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  • Benjamin R. Hopper, Whither (Wither?) Geographical Indications? The Case Against Geographical Indications and For Appellations of Origin in an Era of Glocalization, 16 Chi. -Kent J. Intell. Prop. 210 (2016). Available at: http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjip/vol16/iss1/9 accessed on February 11, 2019.
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  • Lina Monten, Geographical Indications of Origin: Should They Be Protected and Why? An Analysis of the Issue from the U.S. and EU Perspectives, 22 Santa Clara High Tech. L.J. 315 (2005). Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol22/iss2/4 accessed on February 18, 2019
  • Das Kasturi, Geographical Indications at the WTO: An Unfinished Agenda (February 1, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1597091 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1597091 accessed on February 18, 2019
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Websites and New Articles

  • The WTO, ‘Back Ground and the Current Situation’ (WTO November 2018) found at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/gi_background_e.htm#wines_spirits accessed on February 15, 2019
  • Senator Angus King, ‘King Announces Bipartisan Effort to Protect American Dairy Farmers and Producers’ (Angus King. March 12, 2014) https://www.king.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/king-announces-bipartisan-effort-to-protect-american-dairy-farmers-and-producers accessed on February 10, 2019

This article was first published here.

[1] Kal Raustiala and Stephen R. Munzer, The Global Struggle Over Geographic Indications, European Journal of International Law, Volume 18, Issue 2, 1 April 2007, (Kal Raustiala and Stephen R. Munzer) p. 337 available at https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chm016 accessed on February 09, 2019

[2] Lina Monten, Geographical Indications of Origin: Should They Be Protected and Why? An Analysis of the Issue from the U.S. and EU Perspectives, 22 Santa Clara High Tech. L.J. 315 (2005), p. 349. Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol22/iss2/4 accessed on February 09, 2019

[3] Ibid.

[4] Das Kasturi, Geographical Indications at the WTO: An Unfinished Agenda (February 1, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1597091 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1597091 accessed on February 09, 2019

[5]  See full letter on the blogpost of Senator Angus King, ‘King Announces Bipartisan Effort to Protect American Dairy Farmers and Producers’ (Angus King. March 12, 2014) https://www.king.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/king-announces-bipartisan-effort-to-protect-american-dairy-farmers-and-producers accessed on February 10, 2019

[6] TRIPS Agreement, Article 22(1)

[7] Kal Raustiala and Stephen R. Munzer, p. 337

[8] Ibid.

[9] Peter Van den Bossche and Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Material (2nd edition, CUP 2018), p. 1029

[10] TRIPS Agreement, Article 24

[11] TRIPS Agreement, Article 22

[12] Ibid, Article 23

[13] TRIPS Agreement, Article 22.

[14] Ibid, article 22.4

[15] TRIPS Agreement, Article 23.1

[16] Ibid, Article 23.2

[17] Ibid, Article 23.3

[18] Ibid, Article 23.4

[19] Ibid, Article 24.6

[20] Ibid, Article 24.4

[21] Ibid, Article 24.5

[22] Ibid, Article 24.8

[23] Ibid, Article 24.3

[24] TRIPS Agreement, Article 24

[25] 2001 Doha Ministerial Conference

[26] Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 20 November 2001 [“Doha Declaration”]., paras. 18 and 12

[27] Id

[28] The WTO, ‘Back Ground and the Current Situation’ (WTO November 2018) found at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/gi_background_e.htm#wines_spirits accessed on February 15, 2019

[29] WTO Document TN/IP/W/11 of June 2005

[30] id

[31] id

[32] WTO Document TN/IP/W/10/Rev.4 of 31 March 2011

[33] id

[34] id

[35] WTO Document TN/IP/W/8 of April 03, 2003

[36] id

[37] WTO Document TN/C/W/25 of 18 May 2005

[38] WTO Document TN/C/W/25 of 18 May 2005, para. 37

[39] Lina Monten, Geographical Indications of Origin: Should Tey Be Protected and Why? An Analysis of the Issue fom the U.S. and EU Perspectives, 22 Santa Clara High Tech. L.J. 315 (2005), p. 335 Available at htp://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol22/iss2/4 accessed on February 18, 2019 (Lina Monten)

[40] ibid

[41] WTO Document TN/C/W/25 of 18 May 2005, para. 38

[42] ibid

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid, para. 40

[47] Ibid

[48] Ibid, para. 41

[49] Ibid

[50] Lina Monten, p. 340

[51] WTO Document TN/C/W/25 of 18 May 2005, para, para. 44.

[52] Ibid.

[53] ibid

[54] Ibid, para. 45

[55] Ibid.

[56] ibid

[57] Ibid. para 46

[58] Ibid, para. 54.

[59] Ibid,

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid, article 55

[62] ibid

[63] Ibid.

[64] Ibid, para. 56.

[65] Ibid, para. 7

[66] Ibid

[67] Ibid

[68] Ibid.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid, para. 8

[71] Ibid

[72] Ibid

[73] Calboli Irene. Expanding the Protection of Geographical Indications of Origin under TRIPS: Old Debate or new Opportunity, (2006). Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review. 10, (2), 181-203. Research Collection School of Law available at htp://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/2402 accessed on February 11, 2019.

[74] Lina Monten, p. 340

[75] Ibid.

[76] Ibid.

[77] WTO Document TN/C/W/25 of 18 May 2005, para.14

[78] Ibid.

[79] Ibid.

[80] ibid

[81] GATT, Article XXIV

[82] TRIPS Agreement, Article 23.1

[83] Agreement between the European Communities and the US on Trade in Wines L 87/2 24/3/20106

[84] Agreement between the European Communities and the Australia on Trade in Wines L 28/3 30/01/2009

[85] CETA Chapter 20, Articles 20.16 et seq

[86] CETA Chapter 20, Articles 20.16

[87] CETA, Annex 20-A, Part A (Geographical Indications Identifying a Product Originating in the European Union).

[88] CETA, Article 20.20

[89] CETA, Annex 20-b, Part B.

[90] CETA, Article 20.20(1)

[91] CETA, Article 20.21(3)

[92] Ibid.

[93] CETA, Article 20.21(4)

[94] Ibid

[95] CETA, Article 20.21(5)

[96] CETA, Article 20.21(7)

[97] CETA, Article 20.21(8)

[98] CETA, Article 20.21(11) and CETA Annex 20-B Part A.

[99] CETA, Annex 20-B, Part B.

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